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THE SUPREME COURT'S EARLIEST CHURCH-
STATE CASES: WINDOWS ON RELIGIOUS-
CULTURAL-POLITICAL CONFLICT IN THE EARLY
REPUBLIC
Michael W. McConnell*
Decisions involving religion and public affairs are now a regular
feature of the United States Supreme Court's docket, but it was not
always so. The Court's first decision under the Free Exercise Clause did
not come until 1879, almost a century after the adoption of the First
Amendment,' and its first decision under the Establishment Clause came
twenty years later.2 That does not mean that the Court was silent on
church-state issues-just that its voice was far less often heard and that
its legal basis for intervention was not the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court decided three significant church-state cases in the
decades before the Civil War. The first, Terrett v. Taylor,3 along with a
similar case argued the same Term,4 involved the transition of the
Episcopal Church from established church to private entity. The
question, with which the Court grappled, was whether the Church could
keep property it had acquired in its prior status. The second, VidaL v.
Girard's Executors,5 involved the propriety of anticlerical principles for
governance of an orphans' home created by private bequest but
administered by a municipality. The third, Permoli v. New Orleans,
involved a city's intervention in the struggle between a Roman Catholic
archbishop and the elected Catholic lay trustees for control over a
cathedral church, but turned into a case about the application of the Bill
of Rights to the states.
The dramatic facts of these cases, the way in which the legal issues
* Presidential Professor, University of Utah College of Law. The author expresses
gratitude to the University of Utah College of Law Research Fund for financial support
during the preparation of this article as well as Akhil Amar and James Clayton for
comments on an earlier draft.
1. Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
2. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
3. 13 U.S. 43 (1815).
4. Town ofPawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. 292 (1815).
5. 43 U.S. 127 (1844).
6. 44 U.S. 589 (1845).
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were framed by the lawyers, and the Supreme Court's ultimate decisions
cast great light on the religious-cultural-political controversies of the early
republic, and the way in which those controversies were translated into
legal form for adjudication by the High Court. Let us look at those
decisions, consider the human dramas that they reflected, the legal
questions that they posed, and what they tell us about the issues that
troubled the American people in the years before the Civil War.
I. TE7R V. TAYLOR
On its surface, Terrett was a dispute over ownership of a 516-acre
parcel of undeveloped land in Alexandria, Virginia, then part of the
District of Columbia. On one side was the Episcopal church of
Alexandria, represented by its trustees, and on the other side were the
overseers of the poor in Fairfax County, Virginia. In a broader cultural
and political sense, Terrett was a conflict between the rising power of
Jeffersonian Republicans, backed by Baptists, skeptics, and religious
dissenters, against one of the remaining bastions of Federalist privilege.
Still more broadly, Terrett was a dispute about how to manage the
transition of an established church, with all the public privileges that
status entailed, into a private entity with protected private property rights.
Specifically, should the disestablished church be permitted to keep title to
the property it had previously obtained in its prior status?
To understand the conflict-in both its legal and its cultural
dimensions-we have to review the history of establishment and
7disestablishment in Virginia. From its founding at Jamestown to the very
eve of the American Revolution, the colony of Virginia maintained perhaps
the most rigid and exclusive establishment of religion in America. The
Church of England, the predecessor of today's Episcopal Church, was "by
law established." It enjoyed numerous official advantages, including
grants of land, financial support through mandatory tithes, enforcement
of compulsory worship, and prohibition of competitors. More Virginians
were indicted between 1720 and 1750 for missing church than any other
crime, and cheating on church tithes was almost as common a charge. 8
Until the 1750s, public worship outside the established church was
generally not permitted. The Presbyterians first breached the dyke in
1692,9 but it was not until 1760 that they gained formal permission to
form their own churches and select their own ministers. As late as 1775,
7. Unless otherwise noted, the following summary is based on Sanford H. Cobb, The
Rise of Religious Liberty in America 74-115 (Rowman & Littlefield Pub., Inc. 1968)
(originally published 1902), and Thomas Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in
America to the Passage of the First Amendment 29-53 (Oxford U. Press 1986).
8. A.G. Roeber, Faithful Magistrates and Republican Lawyers: Creators of Virginia Legal
Culture, 1680-1810 141-42 (U. N.C. Press 1981).
9. Henry McIlwaine, The Struggle of Protestant Dissenters for Religious Toleration in
Virginia 199 (BaHimons 1894).
[Vol. 37:7
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Baptist ministers-the most obstreperous dissenters'°-were jailed and
sometimes horsewhipped for preaching the gospel. In addition to its
formal legal advantages, the established church also enjoyed a position of
social prestige. Although only a fourth of the population were adherents
to the Anglican Church on the eve of independence, the aristocratic,
educated, and politically engaged portion of the population favored the
Church in disproportionate numbers." But establishment had its
disadvantages as well. The flip side of government support for the
established church was government interference and domination.
Lacking a bishop, Anglican churches were controlled by the colonial
governor and council, as well as local elected vestries. The government
had power to select clergy and to dictate matters of doctrine and practice.
The Church of England in Virginia was an arm of the royal government.
Of particular importance to the Terrett case were the "glebe lands" of
the church. Glebe lands are lands-generally rented out to private
tenants-whose profits belong, by law, to the minister of the church.
They were an important aspect of Episcopal Church structure. Indeed,
canon law required that a certain endowment of glebe lands be made
before a church could be constructed.' 2 Not only did the availability of
profits from glebe lands provide financial security for the minister-and
thus improve the quality of the ministry-but it undergirded a certain
independence. A minister dependent on the collection plate for his salary
may be reluctant to offend his parishioners' sensibilities (especially the
well-heeled among them) or he might be tempted to engage in
inflammatory rhetoric to stimulate contributions. A minister dependent
on appropriations from the state may be subject to political manipulation.
Thus, Edmund Burke defended the logic of the glebe lands system in
these terms:
The people of England think that they have constitutional motives, as wel
as religious, against any project of turning their independent clergy into
ecclesiastical pensioners of state. They tremble for their liberty, from the
influence of a clergy dependent on the crown; they tremble for the public
tranquility from the disorders of a factious clergy, if it were made to
depend upon any other than the crown.la
Most often, glebe lands were granted to the church by royal charter, as
part of the initial establishment, though in some cases they were donated
or purchased with donated funds. In later years, after disestablishment,
the existence of glebe lands constituted an endowment for support of the
10. See Rhys Isaac, Evangelical Revolt- The Nature of the Baptists' Challenge to the
Traditional Order in Virginia, 1765 to 1775, 31 Win. & Mary Q. 345 (1974).
11. See Cobb, supra n. 7, at 483-84.
12. Henings Statutes at Large (Virginia) vol. 1, 149 (Samuel Pleasants, Jr. ed. 1809); see
generally Town ofPawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. 292, 330 (1815) (citing authorities).
13. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 88 (J.G.A. Pocock ed.,
Hackett Pub. Co. 1987) (originally published 1790).
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* Episcopal Church's ministry, which no other religious denomination
enjoyed.
The disposition of glebe lands was the clearest illustration of a wider
theoretical and practical problem: what to do about remnants of the
formerly established church after disestablishment. One alternative was
to treat the Episcopal Church in the same way as other churches and
private entities, protecting its property and ignoring its prior status as the
established church. A second alternative was to try to undo the past-to
strip the Episcopal Church of any property or other advantages that it
enjoyed as a result of its past status. Obviously, both of these alternatives
had their drawbacks. The former would perpetuate the injustice of the
past: why should the Episcopal Church have title to property that came
from state resources, to which all citizens have an equal right? The latter
would require a seemingly brutal attack on a religious institution; seizure
of church property by government does not have a happy history. The
first act of the French Revolutionaries was to seize the property of the
Roman Catholic Church. 14 Moreover, it would be difficult to disentangle
what the church owns as a result of governmental favor from what it owns
by virtue of the support of its adherents. How much of the church's
property should the government take? Finally, once we start down the
road of attempting to "equalize" the situations of the established church
and its competitors, how long may this special treatment last, and how far
will it go? There is serious danger of discriminating against the formerly
established church.
The problem is analogous to that faced by the recently de-
Communized countries of Eastern Europe or that faced by regimes
transforming from an authoritarian, quasi-feudal past. Under the former
regimes in such places, political elites had control of substantial pieces of
property. Does the new regime allow them to keep the fruits of their
illegitimate power? Now that they are mere private citizens, is it possible
to divest them of their property without violating current norms of liberal
government, including protection of private property? For how many
years is their property vulnerable to confiscation?
This difficult situation was compounded by the fact that
disestablishment came gradually in Virginia. There was no single point at
which one can say the established church was disestablished, and thus
no specific point at which we can say that it had become a private
institution, with private property rights. In 1776, the Virginia legislature
14. On November 2, 1789, by a vote of 568-364, the French National Assembly adopted
legislation seizing the lands and property of the Church and converting the clergy-those
who acquiesced in the new ecclesiastical regime-into salaried employees of the state.
Albert Soboul, The French Revolution, 1787-1799 From the Storming of the Bastille to
Napoleon vol. 1, 167-68 (Alan Forrest & Colin Jones trans., New York Vintage Books 1975);
Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution 483-86 (Vintage Books 1989)
(Schama reports the Assembly's vote as 510-346).
[Vol. 37:7
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adopted a Declaration of Rights that permitted all persons to worship in
accordance with the their own conscience and convictions. 15 This
abolished the exclusive features of the religious establishment. But the
legislature continued to treat the Episcopal Church as the "Church by
Law established" and continued to enact legislation governing its affairs. 1
6
At this time, the Virginia legislature "confirmed and established" the
Episcopal Church's title to the lands held by the former Church of
England. 17 It also exempted dissenters from taxes for support of the
Church.18 In 1779, the legislature passed a statute repealing state
regulation of the salaries of ministers in the Church.' 9 This eliminated a
bitter source of controversy and advanced the separation of church and
state another step. 2° The following year, the Virginia legislature divested
the church of its prior civil responsibility to care for the poor of the parish,
creating a new public office of overseer of the poor to carry on these
21functions. In 1784, over vehement opposition by Presbyterians and
Baptists, supporters of the church persuaded the legislature to pass "An
Act for Incorporating the Protestant Episcopal Church."22 This law gave
the Episcopal Church a new legal status as a corporation, specifying its
form of government in minute detail and granting the corporation
authority to have, hold, use, and enjoy the glebes, churches and chapels,
cemeteries, books, plate and ornaments, and other property of the former
Church of England. This was the last gasp of preferential establishment.
It reflected the legislature's view that it had a special relationship with the
Episcopal Church, entitling it to regulate that Church's governing
structure. In the growing tide of sentiment in opposition to established
religion, it did not last long. Two years later, the legislature repealed the
1784 Act, replacing it with a general provision saving to all religious
societies the property belonging to them and authorizing each to appoint
trustees in accordance with their internal rules for governance.2
15. Virginia Declaration of Rights, Section 16, in The Founders' Constitution vol. 5, 70
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., U. Chi. Press 1987).
16. Curry, supran. 7, at 135.
17. Terrett, 13 U.S. at 47 (citing Statute of 1776, ch. 2).
18. Henings Statutes at Large (Virginia) vol. 9, 64 (Samuel Pleasants, Jr. ed. 1821).
19. Henings Statues at Large (Virginia) vol. 10, 197 (Samuel Pleasants, Jr. ed 1822-23).
20. See Rhys Issac, Religion and Authority: Problems of the Anglican Establishment in
Virginia in the Era of the Great Awakening and the Parsons' Cause, 30 Win. & Mary Q. 3
(1973).
21. Henings Statutes at Large (Virginia) vol. 10, 288 (Samuel Pleasants, Jr. ed. 1822-23).
22. Henings Statutes at Large (Virginia) vol. 11, 532 (Samuel Pleasants, Jr. ed. 1822-23).
See Terrett, 13 U.S. at 47 (citing Statute of 1784, ch. 88).
23. Terrett, 13 U.S. at 47 (citing Statute of 1786, ch. 12). The legislature also passed a
statute in 1788, of technical import, recognizing the trustees appointed under the 1786 Act
as successors of the vestries that formerly had control over the church property. Id. at 48
(citing Statute of 1788, ch. 47). The 1786 Virginia trusteeship statute was intended to be
neutral among sects, but it was drafted with Protestant notions of church authority in
mind. On the struggles of the Roman Catholic Church against the trusteeship system, see
infra nn. 132-38, and accompanying text.
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Nonetheless, the Episcopal Church was in an enviable position, not
seemingly justified by its dwindling numbers of adherents among the
common people. The Church continued to own impressive properties in
every parish, and glebe lands furnished Episcopal ministers with a base of
financial support without regard to the appeal-or lack thereof-of their
message to the people. This was a source of resentment among other
religious denominations in Virginia, which had not had the legal capacity
to amass property or endowments in the years before independence. The
resentment was compounded by political, cultural, and socio-economic
divides. The Church of England had been heavily associated with Toryism
(support for the crown) during the Revolutionary period; it became
especially unpopular with the common people as a result of the Parson's
Cause;24 in the years after independence, it tended to be associated with
aristocratic Federalist elements. It found its supporters in such figures as
Edmund Pendleton, John Marshall, George Washington, and (somewhat
surprisingly) Patrick Henry, and its opponents in Baptists and other
evangelicals in the Jeffersonian party. When the Jeffersonians swept into
power in the last half of the Adams administration, they had both political
and constitutional motives for attacking the privileged status of the former
state church.
As a constitutional matter, the Virginia legislature became convinced
that its system of laws had not yet fully achieved disestablishment of
religion. Specifically, the Jeffersonian majority concluded that the
statutes providing for church incorporation and retention of church
property were a violation of the principle of separation. In 1798, the
Virginia legislature repealed all statutes that:
do admit the church established under the regal government to have
continued so, subsequently to the constitution; have bestowed property
upon that church; have asserted a legislative right to establish any
religious sect; and have incorporated religious sects, all of which is
inconsistent with the principles of the constitution, and of religious
freedom, and manifestly tends to the re-establishment of a national
church.
25
In accordance with these constitutional judgments, in 1801, after the
County of Alexandria had been ceded to the federal government to form
part of the District of Columbia, the legislature asserted a right to "all" the
property of the Episcopal churches in the state. In a gesture of
compromise, however, the legislature directed the sale only of vacant glebe
24. In this dispute, clergy sought to force increases in their salaries to compensate for
the declining value of the "currency" in which it was paid, namely tobacco. These were
economic hard times, and the demand was unpopular. Patrick Henry made his political
reputation opposing the clergy demand. See Issac, supra n. 20.
25. 1799 Va. Acts. ch. 8. The dates of these enactments were variously reported.
Apparently, the statute was passed in 1798, but enrolled as of January 24, 1799.
[Vol. 37:7
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lands, with the proceeds to go to the overseers for the care of the poor.26
Church buildings, churchyards, and private donations made prior to 1777
were left untouched, and incumbent ministers were allowed to continue
enjoyment of glebe land income until their death or retirement.
Defenders of the church sought judicial redress, and they knew
where they could find it. It was unlikely that their claims would get a
cordial reception in the state courts of Virginia, but the Federalist-
dominated federal bench would likely be an ally in this political-cultural-
religious struggle. But there was no obvious federal issue in the case (the
Takings Clause did not apply to acts of state government), and in any
event, federal district courts did not yet have general federal question
jurisdiction. The best prospect for obtaining federal jurisdiction,
therefore, was to sue in the District of Columbia. That, one may suspect,
is why the Terrett litigation was initiated in Alexandria. The suit was ified
by trustees of what is now Christ Church in Alexandria against the
wardens of the church, to compel them to sell the disputed parcel of land
and to devote the proceeds to the religious purposes of the church, and to
quiet title. The wardens "defended" on the ground that they did not have
clear title. The other defendants were the overseers for the poor for the
parish in which the church was located-Fairfax County, Virginia-who
allegedly objected to the sale and asserted ownership under the 1801 Act.
Insofar as the suit was against the wardens, it was obviously a friendly
suit. In light of the implausibility of the claim that the state of Virginia
could take land from a District of Columbia church and give it to county
officials in Fairfax County, one suspects that the overseers may have been
friendly as well. In those days, the courts were not over-scrupulous about
case or controversy requirements.
This tactic got the church supporters into federal court and
eventually before Justice Joseph Story. Story, though appointed to the
Court by Jefferson, was an intellectual pillar of Chief Justice Marshall's
Federalist-leaning Court, and his views on the separation of church and
state were miles apart from the Jeffersonians. By contriving a federal
court suit in the District of Columbia, the defenders of the Episcopal
Church thus obtained a favorable forum. However, this litigation tactic
had two potential drawbacks. First, the most obvious ground for decision
was that Virginia legislation could have no effect in the District of
Columbia. If that were the rationale for decision, it would have no effect
elsewhere. In a glancing reference in his opinion, Justice Story referred to
this as a "further objection,"27 but was not deterred from reaching the
broader questions in the case. Second, because the lands in question in
Terrett had been acquired by donation, the 1801 statute apparently did
26. 1801-1802 Va. Acts. ch. 8-9. Again, the statute was apparently passed in 1801 and
enrolled the following January.
27. Id. at 52.
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not apply, and if it did, the statute might have been voided on the ground
that the government may not take private property. This could have left
undecided the far more important question of the ownership of church
property that had originally been granted by the government. Once again,
while relying on the private nature of the grant as an alternative holding,2
Justice Story proceeded to opine on the broader question. On all points,
the supporters of the church carried the day.
In light of the District of Columbia problem and the private character
of the original grant of land, Terrett may have seemed "absurdly easy to
decide," as historian G. Edward White commented in his Holmes Devise
volume on this period. 29 But in fact, the underlying issues, which Justice
Story took pains to address and resolve, were not so easy, and carry
considerable interest even today.
The legislature of Virginia, in 1798, concluded that its earlier statutes
incorporating the Protestant Episcopal Church and "bestow[ing]" property
upon it violated the constitution of the state. If that legal determination
were authoritative, then the statutes under which the corporate structure
and property rights of the Episcopal Church had been settled were void.
Justice Story, however, did not deem the legislature a proper body to
decide a question of that sort. "Whatever weight such a declaration might
properly have as the opinion of wise and learned men, as a declaration of
what the law has been or is, it can have no decisive authority." 3 0 In other
words, the meaning of the Virginia constitution, being a legal question,
must be decided independently by courts, and not by legislatures. Note
that this projects a strong view of Marbury v. Madison31 upon the state
constitution of Virginia. That was by no means obvious. At that time, the
principle of judicial review even at the federal level was contested, and it
might well have been consistent with the Virginia constitution to treat the
legislature's determinations regarding constitutionality as authoritative.3 2
Since all these were questions of state law, it might have been reasonable
for federal judges to treat the state legislature's conclusions with the same
deference they would treat precedents of the state's highest court. Not
Justice Story. Treating this question as within the federal judicial
province, Justice Story had no hesitation in disagreeing with the
28. Id. at 49-50.
29. G. Edward White, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: The Marshall
Court and Cultural Change, 1815-35 vol. 3, 609 (Macmillan Lib. Ref. 1988).
30. Terrett, 13 U.S. at 51.
31. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
32. At this time, before constitutional judicial review was firmly established, legislators
often engaged in debates regarding whether their enactments conformed to fundamental
sources of law, such as the Declaration of Rights. Their decision to repeal a statute on
constitutional grounds, therefore, was not precisely a change of legislative policy, but more
in the nature of a constitutional judgment. On the idea of popular constitutionalism, and
the ultimate authority of the people-rather than the courts-to determine
constitutionality, see Larry-Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Forward: We the Court,
115 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (2001).
[Vol. 37:7
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 37 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss1/2
20011 SUPREME COURTS EARLI CHURCH-STATE CASES 15
legislature. He wrote that the statute of 1776, confirming the Episcopal
Church in the property previously held by the Church of England, and the
statutes incorporating the new church "were no infringement of any rights
secured or intended to be secured under the constitution, either civil,
political, or religious."33 Once the state constitutional objections to the
1776, 1784, and 1786 Acts were swept aside, Terrett would become a case
of private property rights.
Justice Story first tackled the constitutionality of church
incorporation. In an era prior to general incorporation statutes, when
incorporation was viewed as a special privilege, granted sparingly and only
for the achievement of some public purpose,3 4 incorporation of a religious
denomination might well be viewed as a type of establishment. Four years
before Terrett, President James Madison, whose views on establishment of
religion are entitled to particular weight, vetoed an Act of Congress
purporting to incorporate the Protestant Episcopal Church in Alexandria
(presumably the very same church involved in Terrett).35 That veto might
be interpreted as Madison's endorsement of the constitutional ruling by
the 1798 Virginia legislature. Madison's reasons for vetoing the federal
bill, however, were narrow and should not be interpreted as opposing all
incorporations of religious bodies. Madison objected to two features of the
federal incorporation Act: first, that it enacted into law "sundry rules and
proceedings relative purely to the organization and polity of the church
incorporated;" and second, that it vested in the church the authority to
provide for the support and education of the poor.3 6 The problem with the
first is that it interfered with the authority of religious groups to adopt and
change their own organizational structure. This was a right later
vindicated in several Supreme Court decisions, though not without
ambiguity and confusion.3 7 The second feature, according to Madison,
would be "superfluous, if the provision is to be the result of pious charity"
and otherwise "would be a precedent for giving to religious societies, as
such, a legal agency in carrying into effect a public and civic duty."
38
Reasoning of this sort suggests that the 1784 Act would be
unconstitutional, because-like the 1811 federal bill-it specified the
33. Terrett, 13 U.S. at 51.
34. See Louis Y_ Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); G.
Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law 64-68
(Harv. U. Press 1918).
35. 22 Annals of Cong. 982-83 (1811).
36. Id.
37. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America & Canada v.
Mllivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox
Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871). The
confusion Is created by the so-called "neutral principles" doctrine of Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.
595 (1979), which appears to permit state courts to interfere with internal church
governing structures if they do so pursuant to "neutral principles." Id. at 603.
38. 22 Annals of Cong. 983 (1811).
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internal goveming structure of the Episcopal Church. Justice Story
declared that the 1784 Act was constitutional, but without offering any
reasons for his disagreement with Madison. 39 For purposes of Terrett,
however, it did not matter whether the 1784 Act was constitutional,
because any defect in that Act was cured by the 1786 Act, which allowed
all religious societies to appoint trustees for the control of property, in
accordance with their own rules. That appears to conform, in substance,
to Madison's statement of principle. Indeed, it, is hard to see the objection
to inclusion of churches in general incorporation statutes. As Justice
Story reasoned:
Consistent with the constitution of Virginia the legislature could not create
or continue a religious establishment which should have exclusive rights
and prerogatives, or compel the citizens to worship under a stipulated
form or discipline, or to pay taxes to those whose creed they could not
conscientiously believe. But the free exercise of religion cannot be justly
deemed to be restrained by aiding with equal attention the votaries of
every sect to perform their own religious duties, or by establishing funds
for the support of ministers, or public charities, for the endowment of
churches, or for the sepulture of the dead. And that these purposes could
be better secured and cherished by corporate powers, cannot be doubted
by any person who has attended to the difficulties which surround all
voluntary associations.4 °
Story thus concluded that the statutes under which the Protestant
Episcopal Church was incorporated were not inconsistent with
constitutional principles of religious freedom in Virginia.
That brings us to the harder arguments, regarding property
ownership. Justice Story began by conceding that "upon a change in
government" the legislature has authority to abolish "such exclusive
privileges attached to a private corporation as are inconsistent with the
new government."41 Thus, "it was competent to the people and to the
legislature" to deprive the Episcopal Church "of its superiority over other
religious sects, and to withhold from it any support by public taxation."4'
Moreover, Justice Story conceded that in respect to "public corporations
which exist only for public purposes, such as counties, towns, cities, &c,"
the legislature "may, under proper limitations, have a right to change,
modify, enlarge or restrain them, securing however, the property for the
uses of those for whom and at whose expense it was originally
purchased. "43 It is not clear why those concessions were not directly
pertinent to the issue. If the glebe properties were "exclusive privileges"
39. Terrett, 13 U.S. at 51.
40. Id. at 49.
41. Id. at 51-52.
42. Id. at 48.
43. Id. at 52.
[Vol. 37:7
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attached to the former established church, why could not the Virginia
legislature, after the Revolution, "abolish" them? And why should the
established church not be treated as a "public corporation"? And where
did Justice Story derive the notion that the property of a public
corporation must be reserved "for the uses of those for whom... it was
originally purchased?" We receive no direct answer. Instead, the
argument proceeds by means of the word "but."
But that the legislature can repeal statutes creating private corporations,
or confirming to them property already acquired under the faith of
previous laws, and by such repeal can vest the property of such
corporations exclusively in the state, or dispose of the same to such
purposes as they may please, without the consent or default of the
corporators, we are not prepared to admit; and we think ourselves
standing upon the principles of natural justice, upon the fundamental
laws of every free government, upon the spirit and the letter of the
constitution of the United States, and upon the decisions of most
respectable judicial tribunals, in resisting such a doctrine.44
Justice Story did not trouble to identify which principles of justice,
fundamental laws, provisions of the United States constitution, or
decisions of respectable judicial tribunals he was referring to. Because
Terrett was not a federal question case, the court was free to interpret
state law and to apply principles of general jurisprudence not inconsistent
with state law. We can recognize in this passage the same "vested rights"
doctrine that the Court championed in such cases as Fletcher v. Peck45
and Trustees of Dartmouth College v. WoodwarcL46
Justice Story acknowledged that there might be an issue with regard
to property that had been "originally granted by the state or king."47 That,
of course, is the more interesting question. But the particular piece of
property at issue in Terrett had been purchased by parishioners and
donated to the church. It thus stood on the same basis as any other title
to property:
The title thereto was indefeasibly vested in the churches, or rather in their
legal agents. It was not in the power of the crown to seize or assume it;
nor of the parliament itself to destroy the grants, unless by the exercise of
a power the most arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust, and endured only
because it could not be resisted.48
The Revolution did not affect this, any more than it affected the "property
44. Id.
45. 10 U.S. 87 (1810).
46. 17 U.S. 518 (1819). Indeed, in Dartmouth College, the Court cited Terrett as directly
on point. Id. at 664-65. In Dartmouth College, however, the holding rested on the
Contracts Clause, a federal constitutional principle, and not-as in Terrett-on state law
or general principles ofjurisprudence. Id. at 654.
47. Terrett, 13 U.S. at 49.
48. Id. at 49-50.
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of any other corporation created by the royal bounty or established by the
legislature."4 9
All this sounds reasonable, at least to ears accustomed to the idea
that churches are private entities. But it was in fact a difficult issue, for
much the reason that Dartmouth College was difficult: how do we know
that a church or a college created by the state for state purposes under a
preliberal regime should now be treated as "private"? If the Church of
England was an arm of the state before the Revolution, and its property
was subject to state control on account of being a state agency, when and
why did it become "private" as a result of Independence and
disestablishment? Since the property at issue in Terrett was acquired
from private donation, the problem was easily overlooked. But what of the
more interesting case, where the property was originally a grant from the
crown, made specifically on account of the church status as "by law
established"?
That issue was squarely presented in a second glebe lands case
arising in the same Term as Terrett, involving a similar controversy in the
State of Vermont. This case, Town of Pawlet v. Clark,50 involved a dispute
between the Town and the Episcopal Church in Pawlet over ownership of
glebe lands that had been set aside by the crown in the original charter of
the colony of New Hampshire. As in Virginia, the legislature in the years
immediately following Independence passed statutes confirming the right
of Episcopal churches to the property previously owned by the Church of
England. In 1805, however, the Vermont legislature changed course,
enacting a statute on the premise: "Whereas the several glebe rights
granted by the British government to the church of England as by the law
established, are in the nature of public reservations, and as such became
vested by the revolution in the sovereignty of this state. . . ." The statute
granted those lands to the towns in which they lay, the profits to be used
for purposes of public schools.51
49. Id. at 50. It bears mention that when a similar issue arose some seventy-five years
later, the Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion. In Late Corporation of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1980), the Court
upheld a statute dissolving a church corporation and seizing most its property. The LDS
Church had enjoyed de facto status prior to creation of the Utah territory, and its legal
status was confirmed by territorial legislation in 1851 and again in 1855. This would seem
parallel to the acts confn-ming the legal status and property of the Episcopal Church, at
issue in Terrett. Yet the Court held: "From the time of these confirmatory acts, therefore,
the said corporation had a legal existence under its charter. But it is too plain for
argument that this charter or enactment was subject to revocation and repeal by congress
whenever it should see fit to exercise its power for that purpose." Id. at 45. Moreover,
rather than conclude, as in Terrett, that upon dissolution of the corporation the property
must be devoted to its original purpose, the Late Church Court held that "when a [public or
charitable] corporation is dissolved, its personal property... ceases to be the subject of
private ownership, and becomes subject to the disposal of the sovereign authority." Id. at
47. Terrett was not cited.
50. 13 U.S. 292 (1815).
51. Id. at 294-95.
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In litigation similar to Terrett the church. resisted these
confiscations. As in Terrett the particular locale that was the subject of
litigation was atypical. In Town of Pawlet, there had been no Church of
England in pre-revolutionary times, and an Episcopal congregation was
formed only in 1802. This enabled Justice Story to write an opinion that
confirmed the right of most Episcopal churches in Vermont to their glebe
lands, while deciding the particular case in favor of the town. In so doing,
he provided an answer to the unanswered question in Terrett what is the
proper disposition of glebe lands that were originally granted to the
church by the crown?
Justice Story reasoned that the statute passed after Independence-
much like the statute in Fletcher v. Peck-created vested rights, which
.could not afterwards be repealed by the legislature so as to divest the
right."5 2 But, he reasoned, this was true only where an Episcopal church
then existed, which was the recipient of the vested rights. As to any lands
"which had not been previously appropriated by the regular and legal
erection of an Episcopal church within the particular town," those lands
could be taken by the state.5 3 Because the Pawlet Episcopal church had
not been founded until 1802, it could not have been the recipient of any
vested rights. Thus, the town won the battle, but the rest of the Episcopal
Churches in Vermont won the war. It is difficult to resist the thought that
Justice Story found it convenient to decide the broad principle in a case in
which it did not apply, thus deflecting potential criticism.
Justice Story provided two reasons for treating royal grants to the
church as private property. First, he appealed to an interpretation of the
common law, under which the crown could not take back lands granted to
the church even during the age of establishment. According to Story, it
would not be "in the power of the crown, after such a grant executed in
the parson, to resume it at its pleasure. It would become a perpetual
inheritance of the church, not liable, even during a vacancy, to be
divested."54 If that is accurate, then the Church of England was not truly
an arm of the government, not truly a public corporation, but was
independent in at least one important sense from the crown. Presumably,
those independent, quasi-private, rights survived into the era of
disestablishment, for the same reason they survived in Dartmouth College.
Note that this answer was not based on general principles of
establishment and disestablishment, but on a specific (and far from
ineluctable) feature of the positive law of church and state in England.
Justice Story's second reason was that the Vermont legislature
confirmed the church in its property after the Revolution. This was a
feature common to both Vermont and Virginia. It presents an interesting
52. Id. at 336.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 329.
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third answer to the theoretical question of the status of an established
church's property in the transition to disestablishment. As noted above,
the two most obvious solutions-to confirm the church in its property
and to take it away-are unsatisfactory as a general theoretical and
practical matter. Story's approach might be interpreted this way: the
legislature can adopt whatever policy it wishes, but having once done so,
the property rights vested in the church become "private" and
constitutionally protected. During the transition to a liberal regime,
sometimes the principle of repose takes precedence over the righting of old
wrongs. 55 In Virginia and Vermont, the anti-church forces did not take
over the reins of government until several decades after Independence.
That was too late.
II. VIDAL V. GIRARD'S EXECUTORS
In 1831, the richest man in America died.5 6 He left the great bulk of
his fortune to the City of Philadelphia, in trust, to establish and maintain
an institution for "poor male white orphan children. 57 This event would
be comparable, in our time, to Bill Gates dying and leaving his many
billions to create an AIDS hospital in Seattle. It caused quite a stir.
Stephen Girard, a motherless child from France, had gone to sea at age
fourteen, arrived in America in 1776 when his ship was chased into the
port of Philadelphia by a blockading British fleet, and established a
worldwide trading and financial empire. Among his successful enterprises
were banking, finance, smuggling, bribery, privateering, opium running,
and trading in mislabeled goods. He cheated his brother in a business
deal, and cheated his fellow Philadephians by selling cheap French wine
as expensive port, explaining to an associate that they could not tell the
difference. He was largely responsible for arranging the financing that
enabled the United States to support the War of 1812. He was also a
businessman of genius, known for his hard work, extensive knowledge,
and meticulous attention to detail. He spoke only broken English, relying
mostly on his native French. His family life was unhappy. He despised
his relatives, whom he considered shiftless ne'er-do-wells. He married a
penniless orphan servant, whom historians tell us was a nymphomaniac.
She bore him no children, and soon went insane. Twice Girard
approached the Pennsylvania legislature to obtain a divorce, but for all his
money, he could not throw off the marital traces, until Mrs. Girard passed
away in an insane asylum.
A skinflint and a miser in his early years, Girard became more
55. See generally Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford U. Press 2000) (discussing
analogous theoretical problems).
56. The historical details about Girard, which are outside the record in the case, come
from John Keats, Legacy of Stephen Girard, 29 Am. Heritage 39 (June/July 1978).
57. Vidal v. Girard's Execs., 43 U.S. 127, 129 (1844).
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philanthropic and civic-minded as he grew older. Much of Girard's late-
blooming philanthropy was directed to orphaned youths. It is reported
that on his daily walk from the city to his suburban estate, he would carry
a collection of children's shoes in different sizes, strung from a pole, so
that he could provide footwear to barefoot urchins he would encounter on
his route. This was obviously a strange mix of a man.
When Girard died at the age of eighty-one, wifeless, childless, and on
bad terms with his more distant relatives, he directed his fortune to the
welfare of orphans. "I have long been impressed," he wrote in his will,
"with the importance of educating the poor, and of placing them, by the
early cultivation of their minds and the developments of their moral
principles, above the many temptations to which, through poverty and
ignorance, they are exposed."5 8 He thus decided to provide for at least 300
"poor male white orphan children... a better education, as well as a more
comfortable maintenance, than they usually receive from the application
of public funds."5 9 He left the bulk of his estate for that purpose.
Understandably, the relatives were peeved, and sought legal redress.
That was not surprising. But the terms of Girard's will were surprising,
even shocking. Indeed, even the distinguished lawyer who drafted the will
doubted that it would hold up in court .6
In some respects, the will was merely eccentric. Stephen Girard had
been accustomed to dictating even the minutest details of operation of his
far-flung business enterprises, and he was no less determined to dictate
how his orphanage would be run. He determined the size of the buildings
and rooms, the size and placement of the windows, the heights of the
ceilings, the material to be used in construction of the buildings, and even
the dimensions of the wall that would encircle the property.61  He
prescribed an eight-year curriculum of study for his charges. With the
pragmatic spirit often characteristic of self-educated men of business, he
stated in his will that he would have the orphans "taught facts and things,
rather than words or signs." Hie prescribed the teaching of French and
Spanish, and stated that he did "not forbid, but I do not recommend, the
"62Greek and Latin languages. He demanded that "all the instructors and
teachers in the college shall take pains to instill into the minds of the
scholars the purest principles of morality, so that, on their entrance into
active life they may, from inclination and habit, evince benevolence
towards their fellow creatures, and a love of truth, sobriety and
industry."'
58. Id. at 129 (quoting Stephen Girard's will).
59. Id.
60. See Keats, supra n. 56, at 42 (quoting William J. Duane to that effect).
61. Id.
62. Vidal, 43 U.S. at 132 (quoting Stephen Girard's will).
63. Id. at 133 (quoting Stephen Girard's will).
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But then came the shocking provision: he "enjoin[ed] and require[d]
that no ecclesiastic missionary or minister of any sect whatsoever, shall
ever hold or exercise any station or duty whatever, in the said college, nor
shall any such person ever be admitted for any purpose, or as a visitor,
within the premises."64 By this prohibition, Girard hoped to ensure that
the boys' minds would be "free from the excitement which clashing
doctrines.., are so apt to produce,"65 and that the lack of religious
indoctrination during their youth would leave them free when they were
grown to "adopt[] ... such religious tenets as their matured reason may
enable them to prefer."66 He had no such compunctions about premature
indoctrination in political principles. Rather, he expressed his intention
that "by every proper means a pure attachment to our republican
institutions, and to the sacred rights of conscience, as guaranteed by our
happy constitutions, shall be formed and fostered in the minds of the
scholars."
67
It would probably be stretching a point to suggest that Girard's
relatives, most of them French, were seriously aggrieved at this lack of
piety. Any ground of challenge would do for them. But for most
Americans of that day, in the midst of the efflorescence of institutional
religiosity called by historians the Second Great Awakening, Girard's
contemptuous attitude toward the clergy, and indifference -nay,
hostility-toward the religious education of vulnerable youth, was an
affront to decency and an offense against educational orthodoxy. At that
time, virtually all educators, whether in public or nonpublic schools, were
men of the cloth, 68 and education and piety were inextricably combined in
the minds of most Americans. In the words of the Northwest Ordinance,
"Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government
and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall
forever be encouraged."
69
Girard's will, with its references to the "sacred rights of conscience"
but its hostility to organized religion and insistence that freedom of
religion is best attained by prohibiting religious education during the
susceptible years of youth, reflects one side in a deep disagreement over
the character of disestablishment. The predominant American view,
reflected in such documents as Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance




67. Id. at 132.
68. Lloyd Jorgenson, The State and the Non-public School, 1825-1925 31-68 (U. Mo.
Press 1987); see Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 295 n. 4 (J.P. Mayer & Max
Lerner eds., Harper & Row 1966).
69. Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the River Ohio, Ch. 8,
1 Stat. 50, 52 n. (a) (1789).
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evangelical sects, was that disestablishment was essential to liberate
religion from government control. This may be understood as freedom of
religion. Americans at the time were inclined to view religion-and they
principally had in mind Protestant Christianity-as an essential support
for republican government.7 0 The alternative view, reflected in Girard's
will and more closely associated with the French disestablishment, was to
be suspicious of organized religion as a source of superstition and lack of
republican freethinkiing. It was more concerned with freedom from than
freedom of religion. To the extent that religion is constitutionally valued
under this perspective, it is solely as a matter of individual conscience,
with no public relevance.
These philosophical and theological issues were easily translated into
legal questions, and used by the French relatives to challenge the validity
of the will. Both sides hired the best lawyers in the land. The relatives
engaged Daniel Webster, reportedly at the eye-popping fee of $50,000 if he
were successful in breaking the will. 71 The ensuing arguments attracted
enormous public attention, with daily newspaper reports and editorials.
Oral argument in the Supreme Court occupied ten days, and the
courtroom was thronged with legal and society observers, fascinated with
the explosive mix of money, religion, and oratory. Webster obliged the
crowd with histrionics that, according to one historian, caused "tears [to]
pour from the eyes of sentimental observers [while] hardened reporters
smirked about the 'Gospel according to Webster.'"7 2 It is said that he
hoped to ride the wave of publicity to the White House. His opposing
counsel, Horace Binney and John Sergeant, expounded for days on
intricacies of the English common law of trusts. It is said that their
arguments could still serve as treatises on the subject. Indeed, they
performed so ably that President John Tyler offered each a seat on the
Supreme Court. Both declined.7 3
Webster and his co-counsel first challenged the will on the technical
legal grounds that the description of the orphan beneficiaries was too
indefinite to permit a trust on their behalf, and that City of Philadelphia
was not authorized by its charter to administer the trust.7 4 These
arguments would have permitted the Court to decide in their clients' favor
without addressing the politically controversial and constitutionally
challenging issue of the exclusion of clergy from the college. But the
Court did not take that avenue.
70. See de Tocqueville, supra n. 68, at 293 ("I do not know if all Americans have faith in
their religion-for who can read the secrets of the hearts?-but I am sure that they think
it necessary to the maintenance of republican institutions.").
71. Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History vol. 2, 130 (Little, Brown
& Co. 1926) (John Quincy Adams is the source regarding the fee.).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 124.
74. VidaL, 43 U.S. at 143 (argument of counsel).
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The real focus of the case was on the relatives' claim that the trust
was void "because the plan of education proposed is antichristian, and
therefore repugnant to the law of Pennsylvania, and is also opposed to the
provision of Article IX. Section iii of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, that
'no human authority can in any case whatever control or interfere with
the rights of conscience. '75 To deny orphans-who have no family to
provide alternative outlets for religious education or worship -any contact
with clergy would effectively foreclose the exercise of religion. The
argument is roughly analogous to the rationale for chaplains in the
military today: if there were no chaplains, American military personnel cut
off from the ordinary private opportunities for worship would be denied
the free exercise of religion.76 Of course, counsel put the argument more
colorfully. The exclusion of clergy from the college, Webster's co-counsel
Jones argued, "would make it a curse to any civilized land; it is a cruel
experiment upon poor orphan boys to shut them up and make them the
victims of a philosophical speculation."77 These lawyers cleverly relied on
the doctrine that Christianity is part of the common law-a doctrine that
Justice Story had asserted in a lecture at Harvard Law School and that
Jefferson had denied in a famous essay.78 In sum, they were arguing that
it was "contrary to the public law and policy of Pennsylvania" for the City
of Philadelphia, a public institution, to administer a college on principles
of hostility to religion.7 9
Lawyers for the City also led with a technical argument: that even if
the terms of the trust were set aside, Girard's relatives still would not have
the right to inherit. Horace Binney argued caustically that "[ilf zeal for the
promotion of religion were the motive of the complainants, it would have
been better to have joined with us in asking the state to cut off the
obnoxious clause than to use the plea in stealing away the bread of
orphans."8 0 Despite the obvious force of this argument, the Court did not
reach it, concluding instead that the trust was valid.
Justice Story's opinion for the Court was an odd mixture of two
different principles: the right of testators to decide for themselves the
objects of their charity, and a soft reading of Girard's intentions that
75. Id. at 143-44.
76. See Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 234 (2d Cir. 1985) ("It is readily apparent that
[the Free Exercise] Clause, like the Establishment Clause, obligated Congress, upon
creating an Army, to make religion available to soldiers who have been moved by the Army
to areas of the world where religion of their own denominations is not available to them.");
H.R. Rpt. 171 (1850) (concluding that Congress has an obligation to provide military
chaplains).
77. Id. at 146.
78. On Jefferson's essay, see A.G. Roeber, Faithful Magistrates and Republican Lawyers:
Creators of Virginia Legal Culture, 1680-1810 165-66 (U. N.C. Press 1981). On Story's
position, see James McClellan, Joseph Story and the American Constitution 118-25 (U.
Okla. Press 1971).
79. Vidal, 43 U.S. at 173 (argument of counsel).
80. Id. at 146 (argument of counsel).
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rendered the will not inhospitable to Christian teaching.
Story first disposed of the argument that Christianity is part of the
common law by affirming that proposition only with "its appropriate
qualifications," which are to be found in the Pennsylvania Constitution's
articles of religious freedom.8 ' Referring to those articles, he stated:
"Language more comprehensive for the complete protection of every
variety of religious opinion could scarcely be used; and it must have been
intended to extend equally to all sects, whether they believed in
Christianity or not, and whether they were Jews or infidels."8 2 The core of
the common law's recognition of the Christian religion, according to Story,
amounted to the proposition that "its divine origin and truth are admitted,
and therefore it is not to be maliciously reviled and blasphemed
against.. . ."83 Nothing in Girard's will seemed to offend that narrow
principle.
With that minor qualification, much of Justice Story's opinion was
based on the right of individuals to pursue charitable objectives in their
own way. Story expressed a reluctance to interpret "public policy" so as to
interfere with the objectives of a private donor or testator in other than the
clearest cases. The question-what is contrary to public policy?-is one
of "great vagueness and uncertainty, .. ." he noted, "upon which men may
and will complexionally differ," and will be found to "involve discussion
which scarcely comes within the range of judicial duty and functions.
" 84
In particular, he noted, "in a country composed of such a variety of
religious sects as our country," any attempt to define what is contrary to
public policy "would be attended with almost insuperable difficulties, and
involve differences of opinion almost endless in their variety."85  He
declared that "[wie disclaim any right to enter upon such examinations,
beyond what the state constitutions, and laws, and decisions necessarily
bring before us."
8 6
These liberal sentiments might lead to the conclusion that an atheist
or agnostic, as Girard probably was, is as entitled to create an institution
devoted to the teaching of his religious principles as any orthodox
Christian would be. But Story held back from such a conclusion. It is
"unnecessary" for the Court to "consider what would be the legal effect of a
81. I& at 198.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 198.
85. Vidal, 43 U.S. at 198.
86. Id. This resembles the problem faced in Bob Jones U. v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574 (1983),
where the Court had to decide whether a private religious university's rule against inter-
racial dating violated "public policy," in the absence of any directly relevant constitutional,
statutory, or even regulatory guidance (the IRS rules on the subject having been
abrogated). In that case, unlike Vida!, the Court did not hesitate to enforce an
understanding of public policy at odds with that of the private institution. The real (but
unaddressed) question in both cases was the placement of the public-private line.
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devise in Pennsylvania for the propagation of Judaism or Deism, or any
other form of infidelity. Such a case is not to be presumed to exist in a
Christian country; and therefore it must be made out by clear and
indisputable proof. "8 He declared himself unwilling to deal with
hypotheticals based on "[remote inferences, or possible results, or
speculative tendencies."88 The opinion thus fell short of a ringing
endorsement of the proposition that testators of all religious persuasions
were equally free to promote their views.
The question thus came down to one of fact, and of degree.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the provisions of Girard's will on
the basis that "there is nothing in the devise.., which [is] inconsistent
with the Christian religion."89 Although, under the terms of the will,
ministers were excluded from the college, that did not prevent laypersons
on the staff from teaching the tenets of Christianity, or from using the
Bible for moral instruction. Accordingly, the provision was not derogatory
to Christianity, and thus not unlawful under the public policy of the state.
This line of reasoning is highly unsatisfactory. It seems to concede
the principle that charitable trusts must be consistent with the Christian
religion, while relying pn a dubious reading of the testator's intentions to
avoid application of the principle to the case. To be sure, Stephen Girard
did not explicitly forbid laymen in the college from teaching the precepts of
the Christian faith, or of the Bible. But his will made clear that the
purpose of the clergy exclusion was to prevent sectarian disputation, and
to leave the orphan boys free to consider and adopt religious views when
they were adults. Those intentions would seem to preclude lay religious
instruction and Biblical teaching, as much as they would instruction by
ecclesiastics. Story's interpretation reduced Girard's studied objection to
the inculcation of religion in the youth to mere anticlericalism. His will
was upheld at the expense of his intention.90
Moreover, the opinion failed to come to grips with the serious
question of the relation between religion and education. At that juncture
in our history, common school reformers were starting to urge the
creation of common schools, governed by the state and devoted to
"nonsectarianism" in education. Their critics claimed that this formula
amounted to Protestantism in disguise.91 The consequence was to disallow
87. Id. at 198-99.
88. Id. at 199.
89. Id. at201.
90. Story may have been influenced in his interpretation by a report prepared by his
friend Professor Francis Lieber, on of the foremost public intellectuals of the day. See
Francis Lieber, Introduction to a Report on an Organization Proposed for Girard College for
Orphans, in Francis Lieber, Miscellaneous Writings vol. 2, 497 (1880).
91. See Michael W. McConnell, Education Disestablishment: Why Democratic Values Are
Ill-Served By Democratic Control of Schooling, 43 NOMOS - (forthcoming 2001);
Jorgenson, supra n. 68, at 20-30, 111-45; Charles Glenn, The Myth of the Common School
(U. Mass. Press 1987); David Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers: Religion in the American
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public support for schools maintained by religious minorities-especially
Catholics-while allowing public schools to inculcate piety and morality
through "nonsectarian" means such as the King James Bible, recitation of
the Lord's Prayer, and the McGuffy Readers. Girard's pedagogical
principles, as interpreted by Justice Story, were a version of this formula.
Story's opinion failed to confront the hypocrisy and internal contradictions
in this position. Indeed, it was not until after World War II that the Court
would revisit the question of how to conduct public education in a
religiously pluralistic regime.
9 2
Finally, and most perplexingly, Justice Story's analysis of the legal
problem seemed oblivious to the crucial distinction, lurking in the case,
between public and private. The logic of such decisions as Dartmouth
College and Terrett was that the nature of constitutional principles is quite
different with respect to public and private institutions. A logical
application of that insight might have suggested that a private charity is
free to adopt a point of view-even hostility to Christianity-that would
be impermissible in a public institution. The key point here is that
Stephen Girard did not rely on private means to accomplish his objectives.
He gave his money to the City of Philadelphia, and demanded that the City
administer his college on his terms. It would seem sensible to hold that a
private trust is permitted to take whatever view it likes of religion, but that
state institutions, even if created by private bequests, are obliged to
comply with public constitutional norms, such as neutrality toward
religion.
The Court's failure to address the public-private distinction in the
context of Girard's will planted the seed for future controversy. So
munificent was Girard's endowment, and so successful his institution,
that it remained an important source of assistance to orphan boys at the
turn of the civil rights revolution.93 By 1954, the time of Brown v. Board
of Education,94 Stephen Girard's legacy had become controversial for
reasons quite divorced from his hostility to institutional religion-namely,
his decision to limit his benevolence to poor "white" orphan boys. Why
not poor black orphan boys as well?
Once again, some of the finest lawyers in America devoted their
attention to breaking the terms of Girard's will. This time, the challengers
were black children who wished to share in the Girard legacy, rather than
relatives who wished to destroy it. Daniel Webster's role as leader of the
Common School, in History and Education: The Educational Uses of the Past (Paul Nash ed.
1970).
92. See Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vital, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948).
93. Stephen Girard's College still flourishes today. See <http://www.girardcollege.com>
(accessed Nov. 16, 2001).
94. 375 U.S. 483 (1954).
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challengers' legal team was played this time by William T. Coleman, whose
career at the bar was almost as distinguished as that of Webster.
Coleman, the first African-American editor of the Harvard Law Review and
law clerk to Justice Felix Frankifurter, had assisted Thurgood Marshall in
the Brown litigation and had become a leader of the Philadelphia bar.
Later, he would serve as a member of the Warren Commission,
investigating the assassination of John F. Kennedy, as President of the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and as Secretary of Transportation under
President Gerald Ford.
This time, the Girard legacy litigation focused directly on the very
issue neglected by Justice Story: on the difference between constitutional
principles applied to public and private institutions. Coleman argued that
whatever freedom a testator may have to choose the objects of his charity,
no publicly administered institution may discriminate on the basis of race.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the terms of Girard's will,
emphasizing the fact that "the beneficiaries of the charity of Stephen
Girard are not being determined by the State of Pennsylvania, nor by the
City of Philadelphia, not by this Court, but solely by Girard himself."95
The Pennsylvania court also invoked with greater clarity and consistency
the principle with which Justice Story had only flirted: "it is one of our
most fundamental legal principles that an individual has the right to
dispose of his own property ... as he sees fit."
96
The United States Supreme Court unanimously disagreed.9 7  The
Court ruled that the "Board which operates Girard College is an agency of
the State of Pennsylvania. Therefore, even though the Board was acting
as a trustee, its refusal to admit [African-American boys] to the college
because they were Negroes was discrimination by the State. Such
discrimination is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment."
98
On remand, the Philadelphia Orphans Court interpreted the
Supreme Court's holding as limited to the proposition that the City of
Philadelphia could not constitutionally administer the trust in accordance
with its original terms.99 Reasoning that a charitable trust must not be
allowed to fail for want of a trustee, the court appointed a new set of
private trustees, who could carry on the original trust in accordance with
the original bequest. 10 0 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, again
emphasizing that the "real issue" was the "right of a private individual to
bequeath his property for a lawful charitable use and have his
testamentary disposition judicially respected and enforced."10 1 This time,
95. In re Girard's Estate, 127 A.2d 287, 288 (Pa. 1956).
96. Id. at 290.
97. Pa. v. BL of Dirs. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
98. Icl. at 231.
99. Girard's Estate, 7 Pa. Fiduc. Rep. 555 (Orphan's Ct., Phil. Pa. 1957).
100. Id. at 557-58.
101. In re Girard College Trusteeship, 138 A.2d 844, 847 (Pa. 1958).
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the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari,10 2 and the Girard
estate was administered for the benefit of white children only for another
nine years.
In 1966, in an unrelated case, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that it was unconstitutional to allow a public park willed to a city by
a private testator under terms requiring racial segregation to continue to
be administered on a segregated basis by new private trustees. 1'3 Armed
with this precedent, William Coleman went back to court, representing a
new set of black male orphan plaintiffs -this time in federal court. These
plaintiffs prevailed first in district court and then in the Third Circuit, and
certiorari was denied.104 Thus, some 124 years after the terms of Stephen
Girard's will were approved by the United States Supreme Court, Girard's
legacy was held unconstitutional, and black male orphans were admitted
to the College. Now, the College admits girls as well as boys, and
motherless as well as fatherless children.
Are the modem decisions affecting Girard College consistent with the
original case? Justice Story's 1844 decision relied on a unstable mix of
the proposition that philanthropists have great latitude in directing the
objects of their charity, and the claim that Girard's will did not
discriminate-at least, not too heavily-against religion. The first half of
that reasoning is flatly inconsistent with the 1968 Girard College decision.
Whatever freedom private philanthropists may have to depart from public
policy in their bequests, they do not have the right to involve public
institutions, like the City of Philadelphia, in schemes that would be
unconstitutional or contrary to public policy.
That leaves the second part of Story's reasoning. This, too, appears
doubtful. Can an institution, like an orphan's home, shield its residents
from opportunities for worship or professional religious instruction? Can
a public institution exclude all persons professionally affiliated with
religion, when it admits those of every other sort of attachment or
philosophy? Might this not be deemed viewpoint discrimination under
modem First Amendment law? In his argument in defense of Girard's will
in 1844, Horace Binney relied heavily on the precedent of laws excluding
clergy from public office: "the Constitution of New York excludes
clergymen from offices, civil or military. If the situation of a schoolmaster
is an office, then a clergyman cannot be a public teacher."0 5 But in 1978,
the Supreme Court held it unconstitutional to exclude clergy, as such,
from public office.' 0 6 Now that the legislative precedent invoked by Binney
102. Pa. v. BcL of Dirs. of City Trusts, 357 U.S. 570 (1958).
103. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
104. Pa. v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967), affd, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968).
105. Vidal, 43 U.S. at 154 (argument of counsel).
106. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
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has been held unconstitutional, it would seem to be an argument for the
opposite side.
To be sure, public schools now are held constitutionally obliged to
avoid the teaching of religion in their curriculum; Girard probably would
have liked that. But Girard's will went well beyond insistence on a secular
curriculum; it excluded all clergy from the premises, even as casual
visitors. And remember, Justice Story upheld the will on the ground that
it did not reject religious teaching, but only religious personnel. 10 7 Modem
constitutional decisions seem to hold the opposite: that public schools
may (indeed must) refrain from religious teaching, but cannot reject
religious personnel. They cannot assume-as Girard did-that because
a person is a member of the clergy, he is incapable of complying with
public policy in matters of religion. 10 8
Just last year, the Court held that public schools cannot exclude
religious groups, including clergy, from providing extracurricular religious
instruction on terms equal to nonreligious groups.'0 9 The policy in that
case is somewhat reminiscent of Girard's will: the school district permitted
groups like the Boy Scouts or 4-H to use classrooms outside of regular
school hours to inculcate morality and character in the young, and even
permitted such activities to be conducted with a certain religious
perspective. But actual "religious instruction" was forbidden. That is
similar to Girard's insistence that the orphans in his college be given
moral instruction, but shielded from the "clashing doctrines" of
professional ecclesiastics, who were barred from entry onto the premises.
Should Girard's relatives' case be revived at this late date, and
reargued under modem precedents? Might Daniel Webster have been
correct after all, that the "unchristian" character of Girard's will rendered
it contrary to public policy?
III. PERMOLI V. MUNICIPALTY NO. 1 OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS
On November 9, 1842, Father Bernard Permoli officiated at an open
casket funeral in the church of St. Augustin in the French Quarter of New
Orleans. He blessed the body and offered the prayers specified by the
doctrines and forms of the Roman Catholic Church. For this performance
of the priestly function, he was prosecuted by the City and fined $50. The
ceremony violated a city ordinance passed ten days earlier, which
prohibited open casket funerals at any "Catholic churches" within the city,
other than a designated mortuary chapel on the outskirts of town. The
Ordinance should be quoted in full:
107. See supra nn. 89-90.
108. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628-29; Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 845-51 (2000)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
109. Good News Club v. Milford, 121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001).
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Sitting of Monday, October, 31st, 1842.-Resolved, that from and after
the promulgation of the present ordinance, it shall be unlawful to carry to,
and expose in, any of the Catholic churches of this municipality, any
corpse, under the penalty of a fine of fifty dollars, to be recovered for the
use of this municipality, against any person who may have carried into or
exposed in any of the aforesaid churches any corpse, and under penalty of
a similar fine of fifty dollars against any priest who may celebrate any
funeral at any of the aforesaid churches; and that all the corpses shall be
brought to the obituary chapel, situated in Rampart street, wherein all
funeral rites shall be performed as heretofore.
110
A week later, the city council amended the Ordinance, as follows:
Sitting of November 7th, 1842.-Resolved, that the resolution passed on
the 31st October last, concerning the exposition of corpses in the Catholic
churches, be so amended as to annul in said resolution the fine imposed
against all persons who should transport and expose, or cause to be
transported or exposed, any corpses in said churches.
Be it further resolved, that the said fine shall be imposed on any priest




Father Permoli filed an answer to the complaint, claiming the protection of
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.1 1 2 Thus began a case
that went all the way to the United States Supreme Court, and established
the proposition that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
does not apply to the acts of state and local governments.
The arguments and counter-arguments in the case tell us a great
deal about the state of free exercise jurisprudence during that period. In
the United States Supreme Court, Permoli's counsel argued that the
funeral ordinances were unconstitutional for several reasons. First, they
applied only to "one denomination of worshippers"-Roman Catholics-
and thus violated the principal of "equality before the law." 13 Second, the
ordinances "legislate for the priest as priest, and only as priest; not as a
person transporting and exposing, or causing to be transported or
exposed, any corpse in the interdicted churches."" 4 Third, even if the
Ordinance were viewed "as a measure of quarantine precaution," it could
not be sustained, because "such prohibitory legislation infringes rights
more precious than mere animal health."" 5 Father Permoli's counsel
hinted that the public health justification was pretextual, since the
legislators "have expressly waived the penalty against all concerned in
110. Permoli v. Municipalty No. 1 of the City of New Orleans 44 U.S. 589, 590 (1845).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 591.
113. Id. at 597 (argument of counsel).
114. Id. at 597-98.
115. Id. at 600.
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exposing, or causing them to be exposed, and directed their vengeance
exclusively against the priestly function."
16
Counsel for the City argued primarily that the Ordinance had a
legitimate public health purpose. "New Orleans is visited annually with
the yellow fever, in either the sporadic or epidemic form, and strong
sanitary measures are deemed indispensable there to check the range and
prevalence of the pestilence when it comes."' 17 Counsel denied that the
Ordinance discriminated against Catholics, pointing out that most
Protestants lived outside the old city, and that Methodists, who were the
only Protestants with a church in the French Quarter, performed funeral
services at the graveside rather than in the church.11 8  The Ordinance
thus applied to everyone who conducted funerals in the City. More to the
point, counsel observed that "the great part" (and sometimes all) of the
city council is made up of Catholics, which makes it unlikely that they
were discriminating against the Catholic religion. "If Catholics are
wronged," he said, "Catholics have wronged them."" 9 Next, he argued
that free exercise rights could not have been violated, because the
testimony showed that the performance of funeral rites in the church was
not a matter of Catholic dogma, but only of "discipline." "The place, then,
for the mortuary ceremonials not being sacramental, how is the faith or
conscience of Catholics assailed, by designating a few places in which they
could not be performed?"
20
These are essentially the same issues that would be contested in a
Free Exercise case today. How can we tell whether legislation is neutral
and generally applicable? 12 1  Does it matter?122  Is it necessarily
unconstitutional for a law to mention a particular religious denomination
by name, if it is the only one to which the law could apply?3 How strong
a governmental justification is required to override free exercise rights? 124
Does the existence of major exceptions, or of substantial
116. Permoli, 44 U.S. at 600.
117. Id. It is now known that yellow fever is spread by mosquitoes-and not funerals-but
they did not know that then. Even then, however, the theory that yellow fever was spread by
corpses was not widely held. The most commonly believed causes were heat, moisture, and
filth-especially human waste and dead animals. Margaret Humphreys, Yellow Fever and
the South 19 (Rutgers U. Press 1992).
118. Permoli, 44 U.S. at 600-01 (argument of counsel). This was an issue of disputed fact;
one witness testified that he had seen a funeral take place inside a Methodist church in
Kentucky. Id. at 593. Other sources report the existence of an Episcopal and a French
Evangelical church in the city during the time, but they were not mentioned at trial. Henry
Rightor, Standard History of New Orleans, Louisiana 495-69 (Lewis Publishing Co. 1900).
119. Id. at602.
120. Id. at 603.
121. E.g. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 920 (1993); Larson
v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
122. EmpL Div., Dept of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
123. E.g. Children's Healthcare Is A Legal Duty, Inc. v. Vladec, 938 F. Supp. 1466 (D.
Min. 1996).
124. E.g. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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underenforcement, rebut the government's claim of a compelling
interest? 125  Can the courts question whether the foundation of the
government's asserted interest is empirically valid? 126 Does free exercise
protect religiously motivated conduct, or only conduct compelled by
religious doctrine? 127 It is remarkable how many issues of continuing
controversy today were raised by the lawyers in PermoIL If the Supreme
Court had reached the merits, it could have resolved most of our current
doctrinal controversies, way back in 1845.
But it did not. The Court unanimously concluded, in a few
paragraphs, that there was no federal jurisdiction in the case. "The
Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the
respective states in their religious liberties; this is left to the state
constitutions and laws: nor is there any inhibition imposed by the
Constitution of the United States in this respect on the states."128 The
case thus concluded with none of the interesting doctrinal issues resolved.
Not until 1940, in Cantwell v. Connecticut,29 would the Court hold that
the Free Exercise Clause applies to the states through the medium of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and not until
Braunfeld v. Brown 30 and Sherbert v. Vemer,13 in the early 1960s, would
the Court begin to grapple seriously with the doctrinal questions left
unanswered in PermoIL
But let us return to the actual controversy in PermoIL Why was this
legislation addressed only to Catholic priests? Why did the city council
wish to confine funerals to the mortuary chapel on Rampart Street? Why
did Father Permoli risk criminal punishment rather than conduct services
in the mortuary chapel? As a public health measure, the Ordinance
raises more questions than it answers. What was really going on? The
affair takes on quite a different light as an episode in religious politics-
especially as a skirmish in a civil war among Roman Catholics regarding
how their hierarchical Church should be organized in this new democratic
society.
32
Centrifugal and centripetal forces have always been in tension within
the Roman Catholic Church. As a worldwide-a "catholic"-church,
125. E.g. Fraternal Order of Police v. Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999).
126. Compare Smith, 494 U.S. at 905-06 (O'Connor, J., concurring) with id. at 911-19
(Blackmun, J. dissenting).
127. E.g. Muslim v. Frame, 897 F. Supp. 215 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Bryant v. Gomez 46 F.3d
948 (9thCir. 1995).
128. Id. at 609 (Catron, J.).
129. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
130. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
131. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
132. See generally Patrick W. Carey, People, Priests, and Prelates: Ecclesiastical
Democracy and the Tensions ofTrusteeism (U. Notre Dame Press 1987); Patrick Dignan, A
History of the Legal Incorporation of Catholic Church Property in the United States (1784-
1932), in Catholic University of America Studies in American Church History 67-140
(Catholic U. of Am. Press 1933).
27
McConnell: The Supreme Court's Earliest Church-State Cases: Windows on Relig
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
TULSA LAW REVIEW
under the leadership of a single supreme pontiff, acting through bishops
who in turn control the clergy and churches within their local dioceses,
the Catholic Church is theoretically transnational, unified, and
hierarchical. But throughout its history, this unified, transnational ideal
has come into conflict with local centers of power, which wished to place a
stamp of national identity on the church within their borders. The
Investiture Controversy is probably the most famous instance of this
conflict. 133 Sometimes one side prevailed; sometimes the other; usually
the result was some sort of pragmatic compromise. In Europe, the Pope's
principal competitors for power were kings and nobles. In America, as
might be expected, the controversy took a democratic turn.
In the early days of the American republic, Catholics were so few in
number and so distrusted by the wider population that issues of internal
organization could be overlooked. At the time of the Revolution, there
were only about 30,000 Catholics in the country-barely one percent of
the population, 134 with only one bishop, in Baltimore. It was primarily a
non-English immigrant church. As Catholics swarmed into the United
States from Germany, France, and especially Ireland in the early part of
the nineteenth century, they did not wait for central church authorities to
establish churches for them. They did so for themselves. In so doing,
they understandably borrowed the legal frameworks available to churches
in their states, which were based on the Protestant model, in which the
temporal affairs of the church and often the powers of appointment of
clergy are vested in a board of lay persons elected by the congregation,
called variously a board of elders, wardens, trustees, or vestry. This
pattern of church planting was partly a response to necessity, since the
American church hierarchy was too thin and undeveloped to take control
of these events.135  But it was partly due to the legal and cultural
environment. Groups tend to adapt to their cultural surroundings. In
Protestant, democratic, and voluntaristic America, it seemed natural for
American Catholics to found their own congregations, elect their own
leaders, and run their own affairs.
As the American Catholic governing structure became more
developed, and as the authority of trustees began to conflict with the
authority of priests and bishops, the hierarchy asserted-or reasserted-
its traditional authority, in accordance with canon law. Local church
leaders, however, often were reluctant to relinquish power over
institutions that they had created and paid for. Bitter conflicts erupted
133. See The New Encyclopedia Britannica vol. 6, 363a (15thed., Encyclopedia Britannica,
Inc. 1994).
134. Robert T. Handy, A Christian America: Protestant Hopes and Historical Realities 58
(Oxford U. Press 1971).
135. See Randall M. Miller, A Church in Cultural Captivity: Some Speculations on Catholic
Identity in the Old South, in Catholics in the Old South 11, 20-21 (Randall M. Miller & Jon L.
Wakelyn eds., Mercer U. Press 1983).
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over this issue in a number of American cities, notably New York,
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, New Orleans, and Buffalo.
136
This set of conflicts is known as the 'Trusteeship Controversy."
Trusteeism-as we may call the position taken by the supporters of
the lay boards-was "a form of ecclesiastical democracy that asserted the
rights of an American National church vis-A-vis the Roman church, a
separation of spiritual and temporal roles within the church itself,
ultimate lay control over ecclesiastical temporalities, lay participation in
the selection of the clergy, the rights of the local clergy to due process in
the church, and the establishment of some written constitutional
instrument that would define and limit the relative prerogatives and
duties of all individuals within the ecclesiastical community. "137 In large
part, it was an attempt to refashion the Catholic Church in accordance
with the democratic mores of the American culture, but it also had deep
roots in European traditions of resistance to the centralizing tendencies of
Rome. Trustees thus appealed not only to American laws and values, but
also to Old World precedents of lay and localized management and
patronage.
American constitutionalism had something to offer both sides in the
conflict. Advocates of the trustees liked to invoke notions of republicanism
and democracy in church governance, but the separation of church and
state in the United States enabled the hierarchy to assert its authority
without governmental interference. As one scholar has explained:
Unlike the European Catholic Church, which had lost its freedom because
of the involvement of state governments in ecclesiastical affairs and
because Rome had reluctantly and unwisely accepted these conditions
through various concordats, the American Catholic Church was free to
assert ecclesiastical authority and discipline unencumbered by
governmental or lay restraints.
1 38
As a cultural matter, Americanism may have strengthened the trustees'
hand, but as a legal matter, the separation of church and state meant
that the Catholic Church could be as hierarchical and un-republican as it
pleased.
As a former French and Spanish colony, New Orleans, where our
story unfolds, was the only part of the United States in which the Catholic
Church was predominant. New Orleans thus had a different history, but
the trusteeship controversy erupted just the same.
New Orleans was originally settled by France, and was ceded to
Spain in 1763. It was part of the Diocese of Havana, Cuba. In 1793, the
city had become sufficiently populous and important that it was made the
136. See Carey, supran. 132, at 2.
137. Id. at 18.
138. I& at 197.
29
McConnell: The Supreme Court's Earliest Church-State Cases: Windows on Relig
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
TULSA LAW REVIEW
See of a new Diocese of New Orleans.' 39 The Church of St. Louis, which
became the cathedral church, had been built on the main square in what
is now called the French Quarter, across from the Place d'Armes, at the
expense of private donors. 14 Under French law, the right of patronage-
that is, the right to nominate clergy, known in English common law as
"advowson"-was vested in the donor or owner of the property.' 4' Under
Spanish law, the right to name the bishops, priests, and prelates of
Catholic churches in the New World was vested in the King, subject to the
authority of the Pope to reject any who might not have the qualifications
prescribed by canon law. 142 This right of patronage was understood in the
common law as a property right.
The vast Louisiana territory was ceded by Spain back to France in
1800, and sold to the United States by Napoleon in 1803. These
developments seriously disrupted the life of the Church in New Orleans.
The Catholic, French-speaking population were generally hostile to the
American annexation, and feared for survival in English-speaking,
Protestant America. The bishop, a Spaniard, departed when the Spanish
government withdrew, along with all but four of the twenty-six clergy in
the province. 143 The vicar of the Church of St. Louis, Father Antonio
Sedella, usually called by his French name "Pere Antoine," was suspected
of openly intriguing against the government of the United States.144 No
one knew who was in charge. The Archiepiscopal See of Santo Domingo,
to which the New Orleans Diocese had belonged, was vacant, and the
bishops of the Spanish provinces refused to exercise any authority in New
Orleans. In the meantime, a dispute broke out between the wardens of
the Church of St. Louis-called in Creole French the "marguillliers"-and
the vicar general. The wardens asserted the power to reappoint Pere
Antoine to the position of curate of the church. The vicar general refused
to recognize their authority to do So. 45 In return, the wardens claimed
that the vicar general had no authority while the bishopric was vacant. 141
The crisis was resolved when the vicar general died and the province
of Louisiana was placed under the authority of John Carroll, Bishop of
Baltimore. Interestingly, Carroll's first move was to write to James
Madison, in his capacity as Secretary of State, regarding the situation of
the church in New Orleans and recommending several candidates for
appointment as bishop. Madison responded that he could not intervene,
139. Marie Louise Points, New Orleans, in New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia
<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11005b.htm> (accessed Nov. 16, 2001).
140. Wardens of the Church of St. Louis v. Blanc, 8 Rob. 51, 1844 WL 1490, * 1 (La. 1844).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Points, supra n. 139.
144. Id.
145. Id.; Blanc, 1844 WL at *3.
146. Carey, supran. 132, at 137.
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the matter being purely ecclesiastical.1 47 Carroll then appointed a new
vicar general, who-like his predecessor-clashed with Pere Antoine, who
continued to perform the duties of curate in the church. Not until after
the end of the War of 1812 did the Diocese receive a new bishop.
After Pere Antoine's death in 1827, peace came to the parish of St.
Louis. The wardens swallowed their objection to episcopal appointment of
the curate when the Bishop nominated a candidate of whom they
approved: Father Jean Aloysuis.'4 During this period, the wardens
caused to be constructed a mortuary chapel dedicated to St. Anthony of
Padva. It is now the Church of Our Lady of Guadalupe, the oldest church
building in New Orleans. Conveniently situated near Cemetery No. 2, the
chapel was used exclusively for funerals for perhaps a decade, and later
for marriages and baptisms as well. Like the Church of St. Louis, the title
to the property of the mortuary chapel was held by the wardens.
49
In 1835, Father Antoine Blanc was appointed and consecrated as
Bishop of New Orleans. Bom near Lyons, in France, he was one of the
first ecclesiastical students to begin studies after the restoration of the
Catholic Church in France. 5 0 He volunteered for the American mission,
and came to the United States the year after his ordination. It is likely
that this background contributed to his hostility toward the pretensions of
the wardens. The French Revolution forced a number of French Catholic
clerics to immigrate to the United States, where they often nursed a
hatred for democracy, which they associated with the Terror. These
French clerics stiffened the spine of hierarchical resistance to the
democratization implied by trusteeism. "91
By this time, there was a flood of new immigrants to the area,
including Germans and Anglo-Americans, and most numerous of all, Irish
Catholics. They represented a serious threat to the Creole establishment's
147. Points, supra n. 139. Not directly relevant to the trusteeship battle in New Orleans,
but interesting nonetheless, was a letter sent by the Ursuline Sisters of New Orleans to
President Thomas Jefferson on March 21, 1804, asking for a guarantee of their property
and rights. Jefferson responded:
The principles of the Constitution of the United States are a sure guaranty to you
that it will be preserved to you sacred and inviolate, and that your institution will
be permitted to govern itself according to its own voluntary rules without
interference from the civil authority. Whatever diversity of shades may appear in
the religious opinions of our fellow citizens, the charitable objects of your
Institution cannot be of indifference to any and its furtherance of the wholesome
purpose by training up its young members in the way they should go cannot fail to
insure the patronage of the government it is under. Be assured that it will meet
with all the protection my office can give it.
Id. The penultimate sentence suggests that Jefferson saw no constitutional obstacle to
government "patronage" of a religious school.
148. Blanc, 1844 WL at *4.
149. See The History of Our Lady of Guadalupe Church,
<http://www.saintjudeshrine.com/history.htm.> (accessed Nov. 16, 2001).
150. Thomas F. Meehan, Anthony Blanc, in The New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia
<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02592b.htm> (accessed Nov. 14, 2001).
151. Carey, supran. 132, at 17-18; Miller, supran. 135, at 28.
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resistance to Americanization and attempt to maintain a distinctive,
French-speaking culture. The nonliturgical portions of the services at the
Church of St. Louis, the only Catholic Church in the City, were conducted
in French, which the Irish could not understand. This led to a desire for
new parishes, outside of Creole control. The conflict was sharpened by
economic, social, and theological differences. The Creole population was
relatively wealthy; the Irish were poor. The Creoles were anti-
authoritarian in their religious attitudes. The president of the wardens
was even a Grand Master of a lodge of Freemasons.152 The Irish tended
toward Tridentine strictness in their religious observance, and berated the
Creoles for their laxness in religious matters. Unlike their fellow
countrymen in Norfolk and Charleston, and partly in response to the
anticlericalism of the Creole establishment, the Irish of New Orleans made
a special point of accepting ecclesiastical authority. 15
3
In 1833, the Irish people of New Orleans took matters into their own
hands, purchased a property in the City, and constructed a small frame
church, which they named St. Patrick's. The Bishop obliged by
appointing Irish priests to serve the new church. 15 This became the first
English speaking parish in New Orleans. German Catholics also
succeeded in building their own churches.1 5 5 The wardens of St. Louis
strongly opposed the creation of new parishes, which diminished the
population and influence of their own church, and freed the Irish,
German, and Anglo-American congregations from Creole control. Bishop
Blanc sided with the immigrants, and planned the erection of new
parishes in the city. Bishop Blanc also founded the Sisters of the Holy
Family, a order with the mission of taking care of the "colored" orphans of
the city. 156 It is an odd coincidence that the principal figure in two of the
first three church-state cases in the Supreme Court were immigrants from
France who founded institutions for the care of orphans of a single race.
Money was also an issue. Bishop Blanc insisted that in addition to
the salary paid to him by the wardens from the revenues of the Church of
St. Louis, he was entitled to what was known as the Cuarta Episcopal-
one fourth of the perquisites (casual) of the church. This was important
not only because of the sum, but because it would be a source of income
independent of the wardens' control. The wardens refused, and in
retaliation, reduced Bishop Blanc's salary, claiming that he never
preached in the cathedral church and thus did not render services
commensurate with his pay.1
5 7
152. Dignan, supra n. 132, at 172.
153. Carey, supran. 132, at 111, 141.
154. Miller, supra n. 135, at 33.
155. Id.
156. Points, supran. 139; Miller, supran. 135, at 37.
157. Blanc, 1844 WL at *4.
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Matters came to a boil upon the death of Abbe Moni in August, 1842.
Bishop Blanc appointed Father Etienne Rousselon, with whom he had
worked in the founding of the Sisters of the Holy Family, to the St. Louis
curacy.'- The wardens, again asserting the power to nominate their
pastor, selected Father M.B. Anduze. Not only did they object to the
Bishop's claim of authority to appoint the curate, but they also
complained that Abbe Rousselon was Bishop Blanc's "personal friend-a
foreigner, a priest unknown to the wardens, and who had no claim on
their confidence."159 After charges and counter-charges, and threats by
the bishop to excommunicate the wardens, a temporary compromise was
reached through the appointment of a new curate, Father Constantius
Maenhaut, with the consent of the wardens. But Father Maenhaut
quickly showed his colors as a supporter of episcopal authority, and the
wardens withdrew their consent. Bishop Blanc tried again the following
year, with the appointment of Father Bach, but he too proved
unsatisfactory to the wardens.
The dispute over the curacy of St. Louis raged for almost three years,
during which Bishop Blanc twice appealed to Rome for support, and the
wardens lobbied the state legislature to enact a law that would confirm
their power of patronage. In this dispute, the wardens apparently
enjoyed the support of most of their parishioners. In the parish election of
1842, the wardens' slate won by a margin of two to one over the Bishops'
slate, with nearly three times the ordinary turnout of electors.''
It was time to raise the stakes. On November 2, 1842, Bishop Blanc
ordered all priests (except one) to leave the Church of St. Louis. Not only
did this leave the parishioners bereft of the holy sacrament (unless they
were willing to attend a church under episcopal control), but it deprived
the wardens of the revenues from religious services.
The wardens sued Bishop Blanc in state court. They alleged that
their right to nominate a curate to the church was a protected property
right, enforceable in law, and that the Bishop's attempt to frustrate that
right by blocking religious services in the church had injured them to the
extent of $20,000 in damages. They also sued for libel, on account of the
Bishop having called them "schismatics."16 2 They claimed the right of
appointment on several interrelated grounds: as incidental to their
ownership of the church, as successors to the right of patronage under
158. This is the spelling used by The New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia,
<http://www.newadventorg> (accessed Nov. 16, 2001). The name is spelled "Roussilon" in
the report of the case. Blanc, 1844 WL at *4.
159. Blanc, 1844 WL at *4.
160. Carey, supra n. 132, at 270.
161. Id. at 123.
162. Blanc, 1844 WL at *21. If that was libel, it would get worse. In the United States
Supreme Court they would be called "notorious schismatics." Permoli, 44 U.S. at 599
(argument for counsel).
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French and Spanish law, 16 3 and by virtue of thirty years of uninterrupted
possession. Their best argument, made on petition for rehearing, was
that at the time the church was constructed, their predecessors had a
legally enforceable property right to nominate the curate, and that to take
this away would violate the "vested rights" doctrine of Dartmouth
College 64 They did not-but could have-cited Terrett.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana dismissed the suit in an impressive
and eloquent opinion, based on the principle that a civil court has no
authority to intermeddle in ecclesiastical affairs. The court held that the
Spanish ecclesiastical laws regarding church governance "have ceased to
exist, by their absolute repugnance to the fundamental principles of our
American governments."165  The court had no basis in civil law to
determine how a church should be organized: "By what standard are we
to ascertain the orthodoxy of the corporation, or of the bishop?" 66 The
court ruled that the entire matter was one to be resolved by the church
itself:
The Legislature have not, and could not in our opinion, authorize the
wardens to interfere in matters of mere church discipline and doctrine. It
could not constitutionally declare, what shall constitute a curate in the
Catholic acceptation of the word, without interfering in matters of religious
faith and worship, and taking a first step towards a church establishment
by law.
167
All this agrees with modem constitutional doctrine, as well as with the
legal position espoused by Bishop Blanc in the litigation. But it did not
leave the wardens without leverage in their dispute with the Bishop:
The charter does not give to the [wardens] a right to appoint, in the
theological sense of the word, a curate, but only to provide for his salary;
and we do not doubt their perfect right to withhold all salary from any
person whatever, and even to prevent any person claiming to be curate, to
enter the church belonging to the corporation. 168
In other words, they could refuse to pay Father Maenhaut's salary, and
even the salary of the Bishop, and they could lock the Bishop's men out of
the church. The court would not lift a hand to help the wardens, but it
would not help the Bishop either.
The parties thus returned to ecclesiastical battle without judicial
163. They argued that upon annexation of the territory by the United States, the Spanish
King's right of patronage was not transmitted "to any functionary of the United States," but
"reverted to those persons in which the same was vested by the Spanish laws existing prior
to the laws establishing the royal patronage." Blanc, 1844 WL at *2. As representatives of
the Catholic people of the parish and holders of legal title to the church property, they
claimed to be the owners and proper successors to the donors.
164. Blanc, 1844 WL at *25 n. *
165. I& at *23.
166. Id. at *21.
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succor. The Church of St. Louis was closed (other than one low mass on
Sunday morning), and services-including funerals -were conducted at
other churches in the city. The wardens refused to pay Father
Maenhaut's salary, and because of the church closure, the wardens were
starved of revenue.
The wardens turned to local politics. As representatives of the
dominant Creole majority, the wardens and their allies held effective
control over government of the First Municipality-the jurisdiction that
encompassed the French Quarter. 169 Indeed, one member of the board of
wardens was also on the city council.' 70 He obtained passage of the
ordinances, quoted at the beginning of this section, prohibiting the
conduct of funerals in churches other than the mortuary chapel, and
imposing substantial fines on priests-and priests only-who officiated
at funerals elsewhere in the city. This was a clever move, because it drew
upon the precedent of legislation passed in 1827, which had prohibited
funerals in the Church of St. Louis and required that they be conducted in
the mortuary chapel. The ostensible purpose, then as later, was to
protect against yellow fever. 171 But the earlier statute had been enacted at
the behest of the Bishop, at a time when the mortuary chapel was under
his control. Now the mortuary chapel was under the control of the
wardens, and if it were the venue for all funerals in the City, would
constitute a significant source of revenue for them. Consequently, the
Bishop forbade any priest to conduct funerals in "a building in the
possession of notorious schismatics, who might tax them to virtual
prohibition, or apply the proceeds, at their own discretion, to the
subversion of religion itself."
1 72
That is why Father Bernard Permoli, on that fateful day in November,
1842, defied the law and performed funeral services in the Church of St.
Augustin, and why he was prosecuted for doing so. It explains why this
seemingly trivial affair was appealed all the way to the Supreme Court,
and argued so passionately as an instance of religious "tyrann[y]." 7 3 It
explains why it was no answer to the charge of intentional religious
discrimination that "[i]f Catholics are wronged, Catholics have wronged
them."1 74
As already explained, the United States Supreme Court declined
jurisdiction. The First Amendment does not apply to the states, and so
there was no federal issue. Father Permoli's fine was upheld, and the
underlying dispute continued, until at the end of 1844 the wardens
169. Carey, supra n. 132, at 137-38.
170. Points, supran. 139.
171. Permol, 44 U.S. at 602 (argument of counsel). See History ofOur Lady of Guadalupe
Church, supran. 149.
172. Id. at 599.
173. Id. at 597.
174. Id. at 602.
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relented, and recognized the Bishop's right of appointment. All over the
United States, trusteeism was defeated, and the authority of bishops
confirmed. In New Orleans, by the 1850s, the Irish comprised more than
half the Catholic population, 175 parish churches proliferated, and the old
system of Creole control, represented by the wardens, became history.
IV. CONCLUSION
If cases that reach the Supreme Court are any indication, the
predominant church-state concern in the antebellum period had to do
with the organization and control of church institutions. The key to
resolving those controversies was to define a private sphere, protected
against state interference by the vested rights doctrine and the separation
of church and state. This required a narrow view of state action. The
former status of established churches, whether in Virginia, Vermont, or
New Orleans, had to be ignored, and their corporate structures after
independence or annexation treated as a purely private affair. This, it
seems to me, was a necessary turn if the nation was to disestablish
religion without becoming hostile to it.
As the later history of the Girard College case illustrates, the civil
rights era inaugurated by Brown had a different constitutional need. Now,
it was desirable to expand the concept of "state action" so as to bring
powerful institutions in the society into conformity with the pressing norm
of racial nondiscrimination. That expansive understanding of "state
action" played havoc with the jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses. If
government must be nonreligious, and if the needs of the civil rights
movement drive us to define more and more arguably private activity as
'public," the combination will reduce the scope for religious pluralism in
the society as a whole. If Girard College is categorized as "private," then it
can be as hostile-or as favorable -toward Christianity as the donor
wishes. If it is categorized as "public," then it must operate under the
strictures of constitutional neutrality.
The United States is now on the far side of the civil rights era. The
constitutional norm of racial nondiscrimination has been generally
assimilated by the culture (whatever our current disagreements about
matters of detail), and the need to bring powerful institutions with racist
heritage to conformity with that norm has lost its edge. Moreover, the
political victory of the civil rights movement produced legislation that now
enforces the norm of racial nondiscrimination even in the private sphere,
without the need for expansive interpretations of state action.
And so we see a new movement in constitutional jurisprudence, one
designed to allow individuals, even when operating within the public
sphere, to choose for themselves what religious (and other) values to
175. Miller, supra n. 135, at 36-37.
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express-whether the skepticism of a Stephen Girard or the religiosity of
a Bishop Blanc. Those developments are still in flux. But there is a deep
similarity between the current idea that individual religious activity
remains private and protected, even when it benefits from neutral and
generally available government benefits, such as classroom space or
computers and library books, and the idea that church organization,
corporate status, and property needed protection from the heavy hand of
government in the early Republic. The specific issues and concerns have
changed, but the underlying theme of protection for religious diversity
through recognition of a protected sphere of private religious judgment,
continues to inform the law.
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